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Wireless Play and Unexpected Innovation
Christian Sandvig
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, Department of Speech Communication
At the age of nineteen, college student Shawn Fanning—nicknamed “Napster” for his messy
hair—wrote the popular eponymous music-sharing software and demonstrated the viability
of a “peer-to-peer” architecture for ﬁle sharing. “I was at Northeastern University playing
with the idea and getting feedback from my roommates,” he has said, “it was really my ﬁrst
Windows application.” Two years later, Fanning was on the cover of Time Magazine, Napster
had forty million users and Fanning eventually made an estimated $1 million.1 For Fanning,
the situation was unprecedented. He said, “If you’re a musician or actor, you know that if
you’re successful, some level of fame goes along with that. You’re prepared. But how often
does that happen to a programmer?”
An answer to Shawn might be: “More often, these days.” It is true that few programmers
other than Fanning have been featured in Rolling Stone magazine, but stories like Fanning’s
are a staple of popular press coverage about new media technologies. Napster’s story is capti-
vating because it contains all of the elements of excellent drama: youth, humble beginnings,
success, fame, hubris, failure, and a reversal of fortune (Napster went bankrupt in 2002 after
legal challenges by recording artists). But it is also captivating because it seems to teach us
about qualities of digital media. The large electronic communication systems that are familiar
to everyday life are cable television networks, satellites, telephone systems, and the Internet.
These systems and the popular cultural products that they carry (such as ﬁlms and television
shows) usually require millions of dollars in capital investment to produce. If teenagers can
create their own infrastructure or popular content at home, out of software, this appears to be
a dramatic shift in the ordinary state of things. It may be that digital media allow individual
creators more power than ever before.
Napster is software infrastructure—it isn’t music but it is a way to distribute music. Beyond
Napster, this new power to create is celebrated even more regularly for content than for
the infrastructure that carries it. For example, in 1997, Jyoti Mishra (a.k.a. “White Town”)
created the song “Your Woman” in his bedroom with free software and an Atari ST. Within
four weeks it was #1 on the U.K. pop charts. Wired magazine, writing about the big business
of music that year, wondered hyperbolically “how long they can hold out before cheap
technology and the distributive power of the [internet] take over.”2
The authorwould like to thank the authors and editor of this volume, participants in the 2006Wharton
Colloquium on Media and Communications Law, and Shane Greenstein for their helpful comments on
an earlier version of this chapter. This material is based upon work supported by the National Science
Foundation under Grant No. 0546409.
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These are not singular examples. There are many exciting stories being told about digital
media and innovation, and they posit this shift in power toward new forms of diverse or even
distributed creativity. While the internet was generically reputed to increase anyone’s ability
to produce their own content, recent examples are more speciﬁc and well documented. To
name just a few, blogs and MySpace allow fast and cheap online publishing for anyone. New
video game “fan site kits,” in-game scripting languages, and level editors allow the players
to write portions of mainstream games. New audio software has greatly increased the abil-
ity to create digital music, and revitalized the genre of music that is composed entirely of
other music, called a “mashup.” To reiterate, this trend is not limited to the production of
new content—it also includes some production of new communication systems themselves.
For instance, new techniques to interconnect Web-based applications allow programmers to
quickly create a “software mashup” by combining powerful existing Web applications with-
outmuch new programming labor. Although the celebrated innovators can be any age, much
popular attention has focused on the young. Lawrence Lessig, the most prominent advocate
of loosening legal restrictions that encumber this sort of innovation, wrote recently about
the application of copyright law to fan-produced Anime Music Videos. He observed “This
will be the next big copyright war—whether this form of noncommercial creativity will be
allowed.” “When ordinary people hear both sides [of the argument], and more importantly,
see the creativity their kids are capable of, 90 percent will be with us.”3
The excitement is not limited to commentators and scholars: kids themselves relish the idea
of more freedom and capability. Alister B. and Stuart C. Dunbar, ﬁnalists in the Global Kids
Digital Media Essay Contest for teenagers, wrote about how the Linden Scripting Language
(LSL) used in Second Life became an escape and a source of power for them. Alister was forced
to home school after encounters with bullies, and turned to LSL development. (“Hey, I’m a
nerd,” he commented.) Stuart described LSL scripting as an escape he compared favorably to
his earlier heavy use of marijuana. After turning to Second Life, Stuart wrote, “There’s nothing
I can’t do.”
This chapter will examine one example of new technology in some detail—wireless com-
munication technologies—and attempt to determine what is really new about the present
moment. Has digital media promoted creativity in some new conﬁguration, and shifted
power to individuals or the young? (In Fanning’s metaphor, are young programmers the
new rock stars?)
There Are Good Reasons to Expect Transformation
The writing about the power of the internet and of digital media in the 1990s has been
charged and found guilty of hyperbole, utopianism, essentialism, determinism, ethnocen-
trism, and more. Most of the bombastic claims about the transformative power of new media
may have been nothing more than the result of the afﬂuence common in that decade, a mil-
lennial optimism that was ﬁltered through the academy as scholarship.4 Yet, there is good
evidence that some things are indeed transformed as the result of digital media, and that
there is some reason still to take notice of a transformation with respect to innovation.
The convergence of once-distinct media technologies is the reason that innovation on, in,
and with communication systems has special characteristics.5 Convergence literally means
“coming together,” but this distracts from the real signiﬁcance of the phenomenon. The
less exciting part of convergence is the idea that a common format or common ownership
could allow a converged media system to reap substantial economies of scope and scale. Even
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though this is the less exciting form of the effects of convergence, it is worth reviewing here
as it is a foundation for why one would expect a reorganization of media and communication
at this historical moment.
Economists use the phrase “economies of scope” to refer to situations where producing
more than one product can be more efﬁcient than producing just one. For instance, if a
cable company also offered telephone service (as many U.S. cable providers now do), the
same marketing budget can be used to promote both products. Consumers could be offered
one bundle including many media services, resulting in one price for a package including
telephone calls, internet service, on-demand movies, television, and cable channels—all
represented on one bill. This saves the company money when producing these products
(i.e., it does not need a separate billing system for each), but it also can attract consumers
who see media products as related and value the simplicity of making a single payment
to one provider. In this sense, convergence refers to the coming together of media and
telecommunications companies into merged enterprises that offer products across all media
forms.
The conversion of media technologies into related digital formats also promises substantial
economies of scale, a phrase that refers to situations where producing a larger number of
units of the same product allows the cost of making each one to drop. This is familiar to most
people as the rationale behind mass production. If convergence led to more sales, this could
straightforwardly lower costs at a converged company, but in a slightly more subtle scenario,
within a hypothetical converged company that provided content for ﬁlm, television, and
the internet, content developed for one media system could be slightly repackaged and
transmitted over another, creating new efﬁciencies in production and duplication. In effect,
what had been related but fundamentally different products (ﬁlm, television) might become
essentially the same product with economies of scale extending across all media forms.
It is worth pointing out that this situation in media is not new. The telegraph and related
technologies sparked similar excitement about synergies with newspapers in the media con-
vergence dreams of the nineteenth century (though this was not then known by the word
“convergence”).6 New developments in telegraph technology such as the printing telegraph
(invented in 1846) and then-new “online” media formats like the stock ticker or ticker tape
machine (invented in 1857) convinced some newspaper companies that the future of media
would see converged, integrated companies providing content simultaneously for multiple
formats. This didn’t come to pass for a number of reasons, but chief among themwas that the
new formats still required a large amount of effort to interconnect and demanded different
sorts of expertise. This may be a cautionary note for the enthusiasms of today.
New Access to the Means of Production
While “convergence,” meaning a coming together of producers for economies of scope
or scale (or to produce the same content in related formats) is an old situation for com-
munication technology, part of the recent excitement about convergence is different. The
preceding section identiﬁed itself as presenting the less exciting dynamics of convergence
for our purpose here. The more exciting portion relates to the properties of digital informa-
tion. Once-distinct analog media like ﬁlm, music, telephone calls, and television have been
digitized and now share a common structure of binary code. Profoundly, this means that the
means of reception in communications have also become the means of production and the
means of distribution—all are now computers.
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The simplest route to demonstrate this is by example. In 2007, if the owner of a relatively
cheap personal computer installs the free software package Asterisk, the computer becomes
a telephone exchange. If the user installs Photoshop, the computer becomes a photographic
studio. Audacity or Garage Band produce an audio recording studio. MythTV or Linux4.TV
produce a personal video recorder or a cable set-top box. That the means for media pro-
duction and reproduction are so cheap and readily available is a new phenomenon, and it
is remarkable that one common device may act as a receiver, editor, and transmitter for a
variety of products. In addition, as the products are themselves digital data ﬁles, reproduc-
ing and manipulating them need not degrade their quality, require additional materials, or
impose additional expense.
Most discussions of convergence until very recently treated these beneﬁts as though they
would only accrue to large corporations seeking efﬁciency gains in their operations. While it
was clear to many scholars of digital media and telecommunications that a single platform—
the computer—would change the production of cultural products, it was not clear until
very recently that these beneﬁts might extend to the general population of computer users.7
Although commentators linked computers and the emancipation of information and pro-
duction as early as the 1970s, this had been a minority view.8
In the previous examples of computer applications like Garage Band and Asterisk, note that
the malleability of computing resources and its implication extends far beyond content to
include the networks that distribute content. Before digital convergence, communication sys-
tems and their conﬁguration consisted of relatively ﬁxed arrangements of electro-mechanical
components that were difﬁcult to change. In fancier language, the logical architecture of the
network and its physical architecture were the same.9 Earlier, change involved building (or at
least moving around) heavy and expensive wires and switches. With computerization, while
manipulating these systems may not be trivial, at least it often involves the comparatively
easier task of changing the digital instructions for how to do things. Signiﬁcant changes
in infrastructure may now be a conceptual rewiring like Shawn Fanning’s peer-to-peer soft-
ware. Napster only changes the instructions for how to transfer information, whereas with
networks before convergence this sort of change could require an actual rewiring, with screw-
drivers.
There is then some basis to believe that developments in digital media might actually
preﬁgure new abilities to manipulate and reconﬁgure any of the systems of communication
in society. The chance to reunite the traditional producers of communication in the oral
tradition (the people) and themodern, technicalmeans of production for communication is a
heady possibility well worth investigating. Claims that digitalmedia allow or cause new forms
of creativity and productionwere part of the hyperbole surrounding the internet in the 1990s,
it is true, but careful scholarship has found that tools like the internet have new potential to
enable innovation and experimentation in ways that were formerly impossible (or at least
very difﬁcult).10 After convergence, software and media can potentially be easily combined,
reworked, and shared, and the results include important new artifacts and organizational
forms such as open-source software.11
Despite this optimism, it is important to keep in mind that one major problem with earlier
writing about digital media has been that technology was portrayed as an exogenous force
outside history, politics, and culture. To demonstrate that anything is different or exciting
about the present moment should require detailed and earnest consideration of the past as
a point of comparison. At the same time, any investigation must remember that technology
is built by people who spend money and time to shape its development to serve their own
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interest, not to simply facilitate the expression of a technology’s innate potential. If digital
media assists in a shift of any signiﬁcance, there should also be signs of inertia and resistance.
If a shift in power is underway, those who could be usurped should be expected to ﬁght back.
Locating Production and Innovation in Digital Media
Garage, dorm, and bedroom producers of new digital media projects make for exciting head-
lines, but the excitement about those headlines begs the question: Where would one reason-
ably expect new innovation to come from? It may be that the garage, dorm, and bedroom
are not such unusual places for technological production.
The claim that digital media allows new sorts of creativity and innovation from new or
unusual sources tells as much about the preconceptions about how innovation ought to
work as it does about the purportedly novel situation today. The story of garage innovation
echoes many historical stories of invention that have been viewed skeptically by the schol-
arly literature on science and technology. While today’s “inventor-heroes” usurp or bypass
existing industries, older stories of invention also portray inventors who tinker in the garage
and accidentally discover the foundation for a major industry. The birth of the personal
computer, for example, is often told this way.12 Whether David or Goliath comes ﬁrst, both
versions are very much in circulation. Noticing press accounts of younger people discover-
ing things in garages does not yet demonstrate that innovation in digital media differs in a
fundamental way from the innovation that came before.
Although professionalized research and development is an endeavor that has really ﬂour-
ished in the developed world only in the latter part of the twentieth century, it has a strong
hold on consumer consciousness, and on the thinking in some branches of economics. Con-
sumers might be likely to imagine that new media-related products originate at laboratories
or product development facilities dedicated to that purpose by the same companies that nor-
mally supply them with these products. Indeed, “user” or “consumer” has been opposed to
“producer” in most writing about media and computer technology.13 However, a deﬁnitive
work on this question, Eric Von Hippel’s Sources of Innovation, convincingly demonstrates
that in some ﬁelds, users develop most or even all of the innovations.14 Consumers, after all,
are the ones with the most intimate knowledge of the uses for a technology or product. They
are the ones frustrated by missing features or services that could be commodiﬁed—omissions
that to them are obvious.
In the area of cultural products, user-driven innovation seems almost obvious. This comes
into focus by turning away from conduit for a moment and focusing on content. In the
culture industries, it is readily accepted that stars were fans ﬁrst; they were likely “users”
of older instances of a media genre before contributing their own innovation. Rather than
the “R&D” of the consumer products’ world, media ﬁrms have evolved strategies like “A&R”
(artist and repertoire departments) and independent ﬁlm festivals to scout for new products
rather than developing them in house. With cultural products, consumption can easily
blur into production. One could argue that most truly committed music fans also play an
instrument, and they might even learn to do so by playing their favorite song from the radio.
This may seem a far cry from infrastructure and technology innovation. After all, we are
told that performers are artists and that they have something called “talent,” while pro-
gramming is a skill that can be taught. Yet since computing’s early days, programmers have
been “derided for their adherence to artisanal practices,”15 and they have been compared
to artists and surgeons as often as to coders.16 The professionalization of programmers has
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been as incomplete as the professionalization of musicians and artists. (You can get a degree
in computer science, in music, and in multimedia production, but the successful ﬁgures in
every one of those ﬁelds agree that the superstars can be self-taught.) Detailed studies of
programming labor have found that it is creative and performative, with some programming
languages providing an inﬁnite number of ways to resolve a single task of any complexity,
just as there are an inﬁnite number of ways to write a novel.17
Programmers are not being compared to artists here in order to congratulate them. By
reminding ourselves that programming is an activity that may not require formal training
and can be advanced by virtuosos, examples like Fanning seem less unusual. The advent
of the internet has produced a pantheon of programming virtuosos (the rock stars of new
media) from Tim Berners-Lee to Bram Cohen.18 These innovators are often used to embody a
“bottom up” or nontraditional path to innovation that lies outside the traditions of corporate
R&D, but the situation is more complex than this.
It is true that while some of these “rock stars” had formal educations in computer science,
they often pursued groundbreakingwork well outside a traditional research and development
context. While some held jobs in computing, these jobs were often not particularly related to
the innovations they produced. Berners-Lee proposed the World Wide Web while working
at a particle physics laboratory (Organisation Europe´en pour la Recherche Nucle´aire), not
while working in the R&D lab of an internet company. While Craig Newmark was trained
in computer science, he developed the Web application Craig’s List as a hobby and (like
Berners-Lee) because he wanted to use something like Craig’s List, not because he wanted to
run it.
The distinction that is important here is not commercialization: Newmark would later
commercialize Craig’s List and incorporate as a for-proﬁt company, but when he originally
conceived of the project it was as a user of the internet, not as someone whose job was
devoted to developing new applications. Craig’s List started as a hobby. These user-driven
innovations (to use Von Hippel’s term) can be distinguished from the innovation path
espoused during the dot-com boom of the late 1990s in trade press books about start-up
companies.19 That celebrated entrepreneurial path in digital media involves start-ups and
venture capital funding and a desire to get rich, but this is quite different from hobbyists
or college students who yearn to use the technology they are inventing.20 Innovation in
digital media is often portrayed as David versus Goliath, meaning “start-ups versus corporate
R&D.” But both the funded start-up company and the corporate R&D lab are Goliath if one
is interested in the comparatively tiny user innovator. The young innovators like Fanning
may represent the new promise of digital media.
The remainder of this chapter will seek innovation in digital media by turning to cases.
Speciﬁcally, there should be case studies of technological development that help us to eval-
uate the present situation by putting in play all of the dynamics introduced so far. These
include the young, convergence, production in a nontraditional context and dramatic shifts
of function in the evolution of a technological system.
Geolocation, From Big Government to Small Subculture
In order to look more closely at this elusive notion of innovation in digital media, where in-
novation starts, and where innovation leads, it is essential to spend time with the gritty detail
of examples of new media technologies and ideas about them. This section will do this via
a discussion of some little-known developments from wireless communication technology,
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starting with geolocation. This particular example is useful because geolocation is a signif-
icant new technological ability, and the story of much of its development has not been
written. (This relative obscurity will help avoid the distraction of hype and enthusiasm, as
this technological area is obscure enough that it has little popular awareness and no pop-
ular inventor-heroes.) Today’s wireless innovation makes an interesting case study because
“new developments” in wireless is an old topic with a long history, studied extensively by
generations of historians and media scholars, thus providing a useful point of comparison.21
For our purposes, this story begins in 1993, when the U.S. Air Force launched the last
Navstar satellite required to complete the Global Positioning System (GPS).22 GPS technology
precisely locates moving people and objects on the Earth’s surface, and in 1993 this was
ﬁrmly a government effort. The same GPS devices that today produce driving directions
for the afﬂuent originally cost twelve billion tax dollars to build. GPS was developed by
the U.S. Department of Defense and Raytheon, and they intended it as a means to guide
intercontinental ballistic missiles to their target. GPS ﬁts all of the criteria that have been
proposed to deﬁne a “large technological project,” a term of art deﬁning that special sort of
undertaking that includes “big science” and “bigmilitary” projects representing an expensive
and complex societal effort.23 These large projects (like Boston’s “big dig” or the Apollo
Program) address objectives that are thought to be impossible to achieve without a massive
ﬁnancial investment and a centrally managed sociotechnical system to control it. Large
public projects like these are sometimes contrasted to networks and private systems that
begin as small, isolated parts and then become large (like the railroads or telephone systems)
through interconnection, consolidation, or some form of agglomeration. Unlike projects
that can start small, by this logic, geolocation and landing on the moon both require a
gigantic investment in infrastructure before the desired results can be achieved even once.
While GPS has its stories of individual inventors and pioneers, the “S” for “system” in GPS
required multiple satellites to be launched and millions of dollars to be spent before the ﬁrst
person could use them even once to locate anything.
GPS, in other words, is a system that was as far as possible from the decentralized, par-
ticipatory ethos of digital media that now excites some commentators. But just a decade
later in 2003, when the “next-generation” of geolocation technology was advanced by the
Skyhook Wireless Corporation to improve upon performance of GPS, the new version was
built on the backs of disaffected teenage digital media hackers. Without much fanfare, the
innovative infrastructure for geopositioning had shifted from a network of military satellites
to a network of emergent media practices—from big government to small subculture.
Generically called “software-only positioning,” Skyhook’s new replacement for (or supple-
ment to) GPS takes advantage of the prevalence of wireless internet consumer products in
cities. After 1999, short-ranged wireless internet access devices became a fantastically suc-
cessful information technology product across the developed world, both in homes and in
businesses of many types. The most popular type of wireless internet, called “Wi-Fi” (a term
coined by a naming consultancy that does not stand for anything), allows high-speed com-
munication without a cable between computers at a range of about 150 feet. These devices
were often purchased by broadband subscribers who wanted to connect a cable modem or
DSL line to their home ofﬁce without the trouble of running new wiring.
Anyone who bought a $70 Wi-Fi access point for their house after 1999 has been steadily
transmitting a unique number from it as long as it has been turned on. This number is part
of the protocol that allows these devices to interconnect with your computer. In a massive
survey, Skyhook inventoried these numbers across the twenty-ﬁve largest cities in the United
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States, and compiled a database that identiﬁed exactly where in the United States each unique
number had been found.
When a user of Skyhook’s software-only positioning system opens their laptop in amoving
car, the laptop’s now-commonplace wireless internet chip listens for these numbers, and then
Skyhook’s database correlates them with locations from their earlier inventory. As long as
most Wi-Fi users haven’t turned off their access points (or moved, or bought new ones),
Skyhook delivers an address more reliably than the Pentagon, and with more precision.24
This is a signiﬁcant advance. In the urban canyons of cities, the line of sight from a GPS
receiver to Navstar satellites is likely to be blocked or limited, causing the GPS system’s
notoriously poor performance in urban areas. But the denser the city, the more Wi-Fi signals
there are, making the place where GPS is least accurate to be the most accurate for software-
only positioning. GPS usually requires a specialized receiver (or at least a chip), and this
provides a measurement of location that is accurate to within about 20 feet 95 percent of the
time. In contrast, the promotional literature for software-only positioning claims accuracy
rates within one foot.25
Wireless Play and Accidental Infrastructure
To say that all this came from disaffected teenagers isn’t meant to imply inspiration or
provenance, but to be taken literally. Skyhook’s survey of Wi-Fi networks and its correlation
of addresses originated in the folk practice of “wardriving,” a quasi-legal hobby invented
by computer enthusiasts.26 As Drew explains in the underground instructional video “Re-
sponsible War Driving,” wardrivers discover wireless signals by driving around the city with
modiﬁed computers that “show us exactly where [people] are.” All this is fun, Drew says,
because of “the interesting maps you can create and explore.”27
While driving around, a wardriver brings along a laptop or palmtop computer connected to
a GPS receiver. Software like Netstumbler or Kismet logs the Wi-Fi networks that the computer
has discovered along with the latitude and longitude where they were found. The results can
be visualized using free mapping software like GPSMap or JiGLE/DiGLE.
Some of the pleasure in wardriving obviously comes from being privy to information
that other people don’t have, even if it is simply knowing where to ﬁnd invisible signals.
Typically, wardrivers don’t use the Wi-Fi they ﬁnd for any purpose other than to map it.
Wardrivers like to trade stories about interesting Wi-Fi access point identiﬁers they have
found (“im watching you” “garyisgay” “nojohnissupergay”).28 The fact that driving slowly
and systematically down every street in a neighborhood is a suspicious activity adds excite-
ment, and some wardriving sites refer to trips as “adventures.” As one “tips and tricks” site
advises: “Do not draw unwanted attention to yourself . . . do not be nervous of [sic] police
ofﬁcers.”
It is difﬁcult to get a clear picture of the average wardriver. Information on any small
subculture is hard to come by (the most prominent Web service devoted to wardriving had
54,768 registered users in 2006), but wardrivers generally prefer anonymity or pseudonymity
because of the uncertain legal status of their hobby.29 They need to be old enough to have
access to a car, but at least some are not much older than that. This younger group is
joined by an older cohort that has previous experience in amateur radio. They appear to be
predominantly male, and some of them are technically sophisticated when compared to the
general population. Postings to Web forums that betray personal information say things like:
“I have my rig running when I’m delivering pizza.” “I wardrive between home and school.”
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“I need to do some college hw [homework].” “My gf [girlfriend] isn’t into wardriving.” “I’ve
been a radio hobbyist all my life, a ham in the 80’s.”
Wardriving became more of a group activity, and more like a sport, with the introduc-
tion of opportunities for coordination, teamwork, and competition. Early efforts included
“group” wardriving dates discussed on message boards in 2001–2002, attempts to wardrive
at the same time in different places (and compare notes) like the “World Wide Wardrive” in
2002, and attempts to cultivate a Wardriving Meet-up at http://www.meetup.com.30 Artists
attempted to collaboratively produce Wi-Fi maps with volunteer wardrivers, while groups
like NZ Wireless pioneered a way to organize treasure hunts using wardriving equipment
(the treasure is a set of speciﬁc unique identifying numbers for Wi-Fi access points that have
to be collected).31 At this time, articles appeared in “serious” publications pointing out that
wardriving might have useful applications.32
A major shift in the utility and character of wardriving as an activity arrived when Web
services became popular that allowed pseudonymous hobbyists to pool their efforts into one
shared dataset. That is, a shared dataset that allowed them to both cooperate and compete in a
systematic way. Drew (introduced earlier) created the internet site http://www.wiﬁmaps.com,
while Arkasha, Bobzilla, and others (these are online pseudonyms) created “WiGLE”—the
Wireless Geographic Logging Engine. These services allow wardrivers to submit their results
over the internet and aggregate them. By 2005, thousands of young wardriving hobbyists
using WiGLE had cooperatively mapped ﬁve million Wi-Fi networks.
Evoking open-source software production, these sites allowed individual hobbyists with
no connection to each other to collaborate on producing a result that was much greater than
each individual part: a global map of Wi-Fi.33 But just as crucially, the sites deﬁned a venue
in which avid enthusiasts could compete against each other, creating a new incentive for
the discovery of more networks. An example posting to the blog chroniclesofawardriver.org
is illustrative. It reads: “Congratulations go out to mark571 for claiming 2nd rank earlier
this morning. . . . Mark571 is currently 11,248 above my ranking and doesn’t appear to be
slowing down any—watch out 1st!”34
None of this was supposed to lead to geolocation. However, when entrepreneurs conceived
of the possibility of software-only positioning and wanted to test its viability on a large
scale, they found that wardriving enthusiasts were the ones in possession of the largest
datasets locating Wi-Fi. Arkasha and Bobzilla of WiGLE allegedly sold their aggregated Wi-Fi
database to Microsoft, creating a minor controversy among the wardriving community that
was less about the hobby’s commodiﬁcation than it was about the sharing of the spoils.
(One wardriver, mc sikes, posted on the WiGLE forum asking “Now that wigle sold the
data to Microsoft, are wardrivers going to get paid?”) In this way, some of the same bits
of data produced by the hobby have made their way into prototypes and even commercial
software-only positioning products by Navizon, ekahau, Skyhook, and Microsoft.
General Prerequisites for Unexpected Innovation in Digital Media
From one perspective, the story of software-only positioning links terribly disparate actors,
events, and technologies in a web of happenstance that is difﬁcult to believe. To recap, a
hypothetical middle-class urbanite in Pennsylvania buys aWi-Fi access point to connect their
cable modem in the living room to their computer in the upstairs den. Some time later, an
anonymous hobbyist drives by (perhaps it was “SignalSeeker”), hoping to collect the device’s
ID number as part of a treasure hunt. In Chicago, Bobzilla and Arkasha like to play with
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maps and computers, and so in their spare time they build a system to share this hobbyist
data online and rank “SignalSeeker” against “Psychic Amish Stumbler” and other players.
Later, they sell SingalSeeker’s early results to Microsoft Research. Back in Pennsylvania, this
turns out to help a passing motorist in a rented SUV to ﬁnd their hotel. The SUV’s on-board
navigation system uses software-only positioning, but this works especially well when it is
combined with a guidance system for ICBMs (the GPS).
Is this an amazing sequence of events, or is it ordinary? While the details of this particular
story are little known, it is only as strange as we need it to be. In fact, parts of the broad sketch
might seem familiar. The internet, as its history is sometimes told, was invented as a Cold
War communication system designed to survive nuclear attack. It was then transformed by
computer geeks who wanted to summarize old Star Trek episodes and share pornography.35
In another version, supercomputing exists because of the military need for complex simu-
lations of nuclear weapons, but the National Center for Supercomputing Applications was
the birthplace of the ﬁrst graphical World Wide Web browser, written by a part-time college
student and now used by everyone.36 There are many other narratives like these. Wi-Fi and
software-only positioning’s juxtaposition of military technology, play, and production may
seem particularly novel, but it is just this combination of purposes that Timothy Lenoir has
highlighted with the brilliant phrase “the military-entertainment complex.”37
The basic ingredients that unite geopositioning, the internet, and the graphical Web
browser are a large-scale institutional or government investment reﬁned or repurposed by
upstart users. The pleasant surprise in these tales is the unexpected outcome: a technology
has dramatically shifted function. These accounts of innovation invite the reader to celebrate
the romantic notion of the individual, the “expressive, exploring, transﬁguring idea of the
individual” rather than the calculating utilitarian.38 A handful of contrarian kids have cre-
ated (or inspired) a new technology that has real economic value. Horkheimer and Adorno’s
classic rule that in the enlightenment “whatever does not conform to the rule of computa-
tion and utility is suspect,” has been observed in part by ﬁnding new value and utility in
media and software play and exploration. This play is linked with the young, as play is so
often linked.39
Is this sort of innovation a new feature of digital media? Software-only positioning lever-
aged a number of other existing digital infrastructures to produce a new and unexpected
resource. That is, the large technological project of the GPS ﬁrst provided a centralized geolo-
cation system that could be bootstrapped into a better decentralized one (software-only po-
sitioning requires GPS). The large technological project of the internet provided a converged
digital communication infrastructure that could be employed to transmit and coordinate a
variety of media, from e-mail to a wardriver’s log ﬁles or mapserver. The large installed base
of cheap consumer Wi-Fi access points accidentally provided the signaling mechanism that
in the GPS would have required a satellite. The large installed base of Wi-Fi chips in laptop
computers (and, more recently, some cell phones) provided the antenna that in the GPS
would have required a specialized handheld receiver. “Playing with maps” and mapservers
on the internet is an acceptable and encouraged pastime for programmers, thanks to the
many popular examples of hobbyist programming provided by the open-source software
movement. “Playing with Wi-Fi” and wardriving developed as a small but coherent subcul-
ture that provided its adherents an interesting pastime and an identity. Seen this way, the
innovation of software-only positioning was a logical combination of these building blocks.
Speaking more abstractly, requirements for this innovation that could be applied to other
examples could include that, (1) rich sets of information are freely available to be played with
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and repurposed, (2) information resides in a digital format that aids in its ready duplication,
transfer, and manipulation, (3) cheap or free communication via the internet allows the
coordination of disparate, distant actors, (4) important features of existing digital systems
are documented and programmable so that they can be easily reconﬁgured by those who have
the skill, and (5) a subculture exists or can be created that provides incentives to participate.
Stated in this more abstract manner, many of the new media technologies employed by
youth subcultures also ﬁt this general template, as do the interesting software recombina-
tion projects mentioned earlier called “software mashups.” Social networking services like
MySpace and Friendster have promoted themselves as a youth fad and induced individuals to
produce a whole (e.g., a network) that is much more interesting than any single person’s pro-
ﬁle. The photo sharing service Flickr does much the same, relying on the extensive existing
infrastructure of digital cameras. If the ﬁve-part template introduced above represents a real
departure from previous innovation, 2008 could be the edge of a digital media renaissance,
where form, tool, genre, and infrastructure are newly amenable to change and recombina-
tion. But this conclusion is premature because it asks us to assume that these features are
new. Before generalizing about the “new” present, we should look for the Bobzillas and
SignalSeekers of the past. Analog wireless play, after all, was pioneered by young boys and
this led to what we now think of as radio.40
“New Wonders with ‘Wireless’—And by a Boy!”
To those who have read the history of wireless innovation a hundred years ago, the parallels
to the Wi-Fi experimenters of today are uncanny. The argument here is not that parallels can
be found in history for the current situation—history is a large domain, and so it is almost
always true that some sort of historical parallel can be found for any situation. The argument
here is instead that wireless history offers exactly the same sorts of roles, behaviors, and
activities: not a roughly comparable situation but an almost identical one. In the ﬁrst days of
Wi-Fi, much was made of the “Pringles Cantenna”: a Wi-Fi antenna produced by enthusiasts
who modiﬁed a potato chip can. A hundred years ago, the phenomenon was exactly the
same, but the can used was Quaker Oats.
In the exemplary Inventing American Broadcasting, Susan Douglas coined the phrase “the
cult of the boy operator” to describe the culture of radio amateurism and the press coverage
that promoted it in the early years of the twentieth century.41 As a point of departure,
she refers to a 1907 article from the New York Times Magazine headlined “New Wonders
with ‘Wireless’—And by a Boy!” The star of this feature was twenty-six-year-old Walter J.
Willenborg, an ordinary student with a facility for manipulating wireless equipment. A
subsequent article in 1908 emphasized that “even today there are young folks who make
[a] mistake in thinking that all great things that are worth doing have been done; all the
great discoveries made; all the grand inventions ﬁnished.”42 Willenborg was an example of
the white middle-class boys who were advancing the grand inventions of wireless. They did
this by participating “in contests of strength, power, and territory,”43 and by eavesdropping
on otherwise inaccessible signals. Douglas asserts that for the amateur operators of 1908,
technical prowess in wireless was an important new way to be a man. The middle-class
masculinity of the day was dominated by physical and natural contest. As formal education
increased in popularity and duration and everyday life became more urban for most people,
there had to be some way to reclaim “a sense of mastery” using other means: technology.44
Boy operators could still “triumph over nature if they controlled the right kind ofmachine.”45
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Scholars of media technology have given these boys enormous credit for shaping the de-
velopment of radio as a system. The introduction of the inexpensive crystal set provided
the means for amateurs to affordably experiment with radio, and the amateur audience
that they developed foreshadowed the use of radio as a mass medium for entertainment.
By many accounts, the most societally signiﬁcant innovation in early radio was not a char-
acteristic of the receiver or transmitter, but the idea of mass broadcasting itself. With ra-
dio, “it is not only that the supply of broadcasting facilities preceded the demand; it is
that the means of communication preceded their content.”46 Radio companies of the time
were focused on taking business away from cable and telegraph operators, and were reeling
from the collapse of a speculation-related bubble in the stock market. After later devel-
opments in the regulation of radio, the signiﬁcance of amateur operators would sharply
decline, but in developing a very early audience of hundreds of thousands of users and
uses for radio, amateurs demonstrated the viability of a system of mass broadcasting that
would later be commercialized as “the media.” What we know as radio was invented by
young boys like Walter J. Willenborg. In their play, they invented the content and the
audience.
A speciﬁc group of nonprofessionals in the past contributed valuable innovations to the
social organization and the technological system of radio. They initially organized their ac-
tivities as play and as “just fooling around,” and they initially sought to serve only their
own interests. While their greatest contribution was the idea of broadcasting (for instance,
they were the ﬁrst to transmit music over the radio), this was only one of many contribu-
tions. As they had limited resources, their contributions often emphasized overcoming these
constraints. For instance, the American Radio Relay League managed the ﬁrst transatlantic
transmission by shortwave in 1921—a feat that without shortwaves required giant industrial
machinery consuming large amounts of power.
Some of the rules and games of wireless play are identical, even after ninety years. NZ
Wireless’s Wi-Fi treasure hunts, mentioned earlier, are the same sort of organized seeking for
particular signals that early radio amateurs pursued under a variety of names.47 Much like the
wardrivers of the twenty-ﬁrst century, the early twentieth century pioneers often organized
themselves while at play, and some activities took the form of a contest. Starting in 1916, the
U.S. amateurs began to organize large-scale radio relays that would convey messages across
the country (in 1916, a message from Iowa reached both coasts in about an hour).48 These
relays emphasized different characteristics of wireless technology at different times (e.g.,
some were speed contests, some experiments with reliability checks). The organizational
vehicle for these relays, called the American Radio Relay League, became the dominant
membership association for amateur radio.
Bobzilla and Arkasha’s creation ofWiGLE (theWireless Geographic Logging Engine) on the
internet to organize wardrivers was then a newer version of an old effort. Bobzilla and Arkasha
used a dedicated Web server and computer programming expertise to harness the latest
geographic information systems (GIS) and technologies. In 1916, W. H. Kirwan bought “a
largemap of theUnited States and a pair of compasses,” andwhenhewanted to communicate
with amateur stations, he produced mass mailings of 1,000 letters.49
So, the users of radio and software-only positioning both have some maverick teenagers
to thank. With this in mind, the account of the wireless wardriver accidentally helping
the driver of the rented SUV should start to seem less strange. The development of any
technology involves a complicated tangle of associations that looks odd whenever anyone
stops to look at it closely enough.50 In these accounts, the involvement of youth, whimsy,
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and play often seems to be the most exciting and unexpected feature of invention. But this
shouldn’t seem strange either, as this combination is a leftover from the Enlightenment
discovery of the imagination and its transformation through the eighteenth century into an
attitude that gloriﬁes creativity, “. . . freedom, originality, genius, the arts, and the innocent
and uncorrupted character of childhood vision.”51 All of this is to say that linking teenagers
playing around to new kinds of invention is in the longer view an awfully familiar “unfamiliar
story.”
The Prerequisites Revisited: What’s Different Now?
Earlier, this chapter posited ﬁve general prerequisites for unexpected innovation in digital
media. Summarized again concisely, they were as follows: (1) rich sets of data, (2) digital
formats, (3) cheap communication, (4) open, documented interfaces, and (5) a subculture of
innovators. After a short detour to the history of wireless play and radio amateurism ninety
years ago, it should now be clearer that surprising things can also be accomplished with poor
sets of data, expensive communication, and analog formats (the ﬁrst three prerequisites).
If the new availability of data in a digital format combined with the cheap ability to
communicate it is all that is truly new (our ﬁrst three prerequisites), then there has been no
revolutionary shift in innovation, but instead a simpler quickening. If the Shawn Fannings of
the world are not a new phenomenon, it may still be that there are more chances to innovate
in this manner now. Von Hippel depicts an acceleration of user-driven innovation across
society in just this way: not as a wholesale transformation, but as a change in scale. “[R]apid
technological advances in computer hardware and software and networking technologies
have made it much easier to create and sustain a communal development style on ever-
larger scales,” he writes, due in part to “prepackaged infrastructural support” for subcultures
of innovators.52
The fourth prerequisite—open, documented interfaces—simply isn’t new. Open interfaces
can be thought of both as a feature of a technology’s development over time and as a decision
made by the organizations involved in technology production. That is, radio was malleable
by young boys in the 1920s in part because the knowledge of radio was so new (and so
sparse) that it could be readily grasped and manipulated. The apparatus employed in early
radio was much simpler than that used in later developments (such as satellite radio). While
in the modern example of geolocation, GPS and Wi-Fi were open standards, freely available,
there is no reason that they need be public, and in fact all of the operation of GPS used to
be a government secret. Open interfaces can be found throughout the history of technology
development in situations where ﬁrms found it more expedient to share information about
technology and compete on some other ﬁeld. (This is related to the business strategy of
actively sharing technological innovations rather than keeping them secret, called “free
revealing”).53
While the ﬁfth prerequisite (a subculture of innovators) has garnered a lot of attention
recently, the young inventor-hero and the subculture of innovation is surely not a new
phenomenon (as Walter J. Willenborg would agree, if he were still living).
This nuance separating a simple quickening of some features of innovation versus a whole-
sale transformation of innovation is of the utmost importance. This nuance has been lost
in the public debate about the transformative power of digital media, and this has conse-
quences for action. If fans of distributed creativity and decentralized innovation can locate
some fundamental notion of positive empowerment inside the nature of digital media, they
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need to do nothing. As digital media marches across the landscape, power will shift, cre-
ativity will blossom, and we only have to pause and appreciate the results (“There’s nothing
I can’t do,” as Stuart wrote). Instead of this view, the preceding discussion suggests that
there are historical precedents for the current excitement. “Programmers are the new rock
stars” is nothing more than the latest installment of a recurring phenomenon, as amateurs
were the new radio stars. In a longer historical perspective, doing nothing but waiting for
the transformation won’t work. The transformation won’t arrive, and there is a need to
ﬁgure out why not. Amateurs are not radio stars today—or to speak more generally, these
positive phenomena seem associated with the birth of a communication technology, but
then they disappear. It is also worth asking why these features of distributed innovation and
creativity failed to transform society in the past—after all, here it is needing transformation
again.
Innovation by Whom and for What?
A useful way to conceptualize the state of digital media and innovation today, then, isn’t
as a “transformation,” but as something much more worrying: it is the predictable process
of things staying the same while established centers of power and structure exert their
inﬂuence. Arkasha, Bobzilla, Walter J. Willenborg, and Shawn Fanning have almost been
collected from central casting to play the role of a young innovator. There is a reason that
the role is typecast: the population of innovators in information technology is remarkably
homogeneous. There is even a word to distinguish the class of people who can participate in
conﬁguring information technology, and that word is “nerd.” (Remember Alister B. wrote,
“Hey, I’m a nerd,” to justify his own scripting habits.) Little systematic demographic data
exist on the new or old waves of innovators, but a moment’s examination reveals that
information technology innovators inhabit an overwhelmingly privileged world. Recent
reports of a new “participatory culture” arising from digital media beg the question: Who
may participate, for what purpose?54 The answers don’t reveal a newworld where anyone can
be discovered to be a rock star or a rock star programmer. Instead, content and technology
production seem to rest ﬁrmly with the same sorts of people we would expect after a review
of radio amateurs: these are white, well-educated young men, typically from middle-class
backgrounds.
Race and privilege are not raised here just to point out the ongoing inequality of society
(although that would be reason enough). Instead, when considering the topic of innovation,
the scholarship very clearly states that who innovates is absolutely critical to the kinds of
innovations produced.55 Creators of our new technologies overwhelmingly imagine them-
selves as the users (at least at ﬁrst), whether they work in an R&D lab or not. Who they are,
the kind of things they like, and the kind of things they want dictate the limits of their imag-
ination for new inventions and features. As discussed earlier, many innovations come from
users, and so it is uncontroversial to point out that the user and technology developer can be
the same person, as in von Hippel’s phrase “user-innovator.” However, more fundamentally,
scholarship in technology studies has found that any technological innovation is itself an act
of projection where a designer actively constructs an idealized use and user for their product.
This idealized or projected user—sometimes called “the reﬂexive user”—is intermingled with
the developer’s own identity, and this process is more prevalent during the earliest days of a
technological system, as Bardini and Horvath have shown for the evolution of the personal
computer.56 While this concept has been used to describe technology production, there is
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no reason not to extend this idea to content. In the production of media content, it isn’t
a surprise that the directors, writers, and artists strive to produce ﬁlm, text, and artwork
that they would like, and to capture the attention of an audience like themselves and their
friends.
This is a valuable shift in perspective because it invites us to stop searching for bottlenecks,
or at least to reconceptualize them. In past fears about cultural domination, the concentration
of cultural production, and technological disenfranchisement, the focus has always been on
the few people that seem to get to decide “for the rest of us.” The large technology producers,
talent scouts, television executives, the Hollywood studio system are to blame, and have to
be eliminated or bypassed. But today’s excitement about digital media has bypassed the
bottlenecks, and revealed a mass of creative people who often look just like, and aspire to be
just like, large technology producers, talent scouts, television executives, and the Hollywood
studio system.
Just a few examples will cement this point. In 2007, the potato chip brand Doritos followed
a recent trend toward embracing consumer-produced marketing and partnered with Yahoo!
Video to hold the “Crash the Super Bowl Contest.” In brief, anyone could create and submit
their own thirty-second commercial for Doritos, and Yahoo! Video users could vote for their
favorite. Doritos would then pay to air the winning spot during the Super Bowl—long the
most important and expensive (and therefore exclusive) venue for television advertising. The
amateur users banded together and produced . . . a professional set of Doritos’ commercials.
One of the common remarks posted to the Yahoo! and YouTube sites of the contenders was
that the videos were “so professional.” Indeed, they were indistinguishable from the recent
output of any professional ad agency, and the participants in the contest wrote about how
they hoped for professional media jobs.
There is more to these Doritos than what has been made by recent cultural criticism.
For instance, recent essays have pointed out that replacing mass media gatekeepers with
distributed creativity hasn’t unleashed a dynamo of creativity that was formerly repressed;
it has only revealed the atrocious taste of the masses. (Jaron Lanier crystallized this critique
with the phrase, “The hive mind is for the most part stupid and boring.”)57
Most of the content and technology producers in the wireless case studies reviewed earlier
do not aspire to a viable alternative infrastructure or new form of cultural organization, but
this isn’t because they have poor taste. They aspire to participate in the structures that exist
already, or to build their own structures that are very similar, but have them in charge. This
isn’t their failing, it is their motivation—what makes their actions comprehensible. In the
case of geolocation, Wi-Fi experimentation was a route for many technology amateurs to
professionalize. Experiments with wireless systems, treasure hunts, and amateur collectives
became items on the resumes of many who later went into some aspect of the informa-
tion technology industry (if they didn’t start there in the ﬁrst place). Before Wi-Fi became
widespread, wireless network engineering was not a common job classiﬁcation and did not
have a career path. When young wireless experimenters reminisce about their successes, they
say things like, “it got us some consulting work,” “I do consulting for [wireless] companies
now,” “it got him a job in Milwaukee in the end,” “we split that off into a private company,”
“it attracted attention for my business,” “it got you and me a skill set, which got us pretty
nice jobs,” and “now we have a business plan.”58 Studies of early technology experimenters
across history have shown that technology tinkering can be an excellent route to becoming
an insider.59 But for this strategy to work, the tinkerer can’t be that far from an insider in the
ﬁrst place.
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Production Values: A Permanent Gulf
A meaningful confusion may still be lingering after the examples of wireless and Doritos.
Above, Yahoo! Video and YouTube users were able to ape major advertising agencies using
only desktop equipment, and wireless amateurs of the present were sometimes depicted con-
ducting essentially the same activities as well-ﬁnanced corporations (such as the assembly of
nationalWi-Fi databases). Is this, then, what is new about digital media—that producers with
so few resources are able to perform the same way as well-funded institutions? Unfortunately
not: recall that radio amateurs in the past also performed these feats, and better. They were
able to provide both transcontinental and transatlantic message service. It is not new that
poorly ﬁnanced contributors can have a role in new technology or content development
or that barriers to entry are low in some technological areas. The presence of user-driven
innovation and peer production now does not particularly indicate that a transformation is
underway. For the earlier writing about convergence, it was an error of reasoning to think
that the beneﬁts of digital convergence would accrue only to producers and corporations,
and not to users. But it is another sort of error to think that this implies that the differential
in resources between producers and corporations no longer matters. In media industries,
production values have historically been the route to enforcing the boundary between pro-
fessional and amateur content. In the United States, most people have been able to record
their own music (or even their own television show) for some time and distribute it them-
selves, or air it on a local radio station or public access station. Still, there is an ever-evolving
professional “sound” and a “look” that are difﬁcult to emulate. Just as the style of one genre
becomes widely imitable (as in the thirty-second Doritos television commercial), other forms
slide farther out of reach as studios develop and invest in new technologies for lighting, edit-
ing, and computer-generated animation. Today, it may be easy to make your own Web page,
but it is difﬁcult to make a database-driven, Flash-enhanced, interactive site that looks the
same as one produced by a large media corporation. The effects achieved by professional
media industries are designed to look expensive and to be expensive in order to police this
boundary. This may be one reason that the user interface has presented such an obstacle
to open-source software development. By far the most successful open source products are
server side and have little user interface and therefore little need for a look-and-feel that
competes with Microsoft or Apple.
To scale the wall of production value and try to produce something that will be an entre´e
into professionalization, the amateur will face a number of daunting obstacles. Whether the
vehicle is writing, photographs, ﬁlm, or software, to even make an attempt requires literacy
and entails a large investment in education. Worse, all of these objects contain cultural
markers that do more than separate professional production values from amateur ones; they
also reinforce the dominant conceptualization of the audience or the user. These range from
male terminology in computing to the dominance of afﬂuent perspectives in ﬁction writing.
Waiting for a Transformation, or Working for It
All this means that the people puzzling over interesting stories of peer production and
unexpected innovation in digital media may not have discovered the route to any sort of
revolution. Wanting a decentralized emancipatory technology badly enough may sufﬁce
for seeing one. This desire to build or ﬁnd the “machine in the garden” (the American
pastoral ideal resurgent, the preference for the diffuse over the centralized) is a powerful and
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alluring current in Western thought.60 But taking von Hippel’s earlier point seriously, most
innovation may be user-driven. The innovator’s garage, basement, and even youth may be
completely normal. Peer production of content or infrastructure is then emphatically not a
crack in the armor of an evil monolith, or a shift in power relations, but a more ordinary
point of entry and commodiﬁcation. A&R may be the new R&D, but the A&R department
isn’t run by artists, and any artist who has dealt with one will tell you that A&R’s ascendancy
doesn’t mean that the talent will be getting a better deal anytime soon.
Reﬂect, for a moment, on the evolution of the newspaper as a capsule version of the other
technological accounts developed in this chapter. While the newspaper has been written
about as the epitome of the one-to-many, “mass” media form, the earliest newspapers in
America were printed with blank pages at the end so that the readers could write in their
own content. It is extravagant to think this affordance as “peer production” or as a way to
redistribute the power of the press. Instead, it seems born of the material conditions of the
newspapers of the day. They were infrequent, rare, expensive, and they tended to circulate
through many hands and many sets of eyes. Indeed, before 1830, the American newspaper
had no paid reporters (there was yet no profession of reporter), and instead relied upon the
publisher’s own writing and contributed letters. Again, it is too much to think that printing
these letters was a democratic gesture (they usually came from the publisher’s friends, and
they were one more thing the publisher didn’t have to write).61 Today, nonprofessionals
still have a means of entry into the pages of a newspaper: the “letters to the editor” section.
Although they are often studied by journalism professors, letters to the editor have not been
found to be a signiﬁcant source of power to anyone. They may have the least power to inﬂu-
ence the development of the communication technology that carries them (the newspaper).
Indeed, professional journalists almost uniformly hold letter writers in contempt, and im-
plement the letters’ section in ways that are actively antidemocratic.62 Even the accessibility
of the technology of print itself is confusingly open to interpretation. While in democratic
theory the press has been described as open to “anyone,” it still requires literacy, technolog-
ical expertise, cultural capital, and (for publishers, not letterwriters) it has been expensive.
For much of its history, the American newspaper has been a discussion vehicle for afﬂuent
white men. The newspaper is surely not a perfect comparison to wireless, the internet, or
digital media, but it does serve to highlight the longstanding history of user-contributed
content and some of its complications. In secondary school civics classes, teenagers can start
their own (small, badly ﬁnanced) newspapers and contribute letters to existing newspapers,
but this is stiﬂingly mainstream and not a transformative new practice with communication
technology. It is no surprise that both scholars and teenagers themselves prefer to talk about
the potential of Second Life.
This chapter has tried to portray the linkage of play, young people, and innovation in
digital media as ordinary and not transformative. It has tried to replace the popular accounts
of “young rebels” who seek to overturn the established order with a portrait of the usual
suspects (i.e., well-educated, white, male innovators; nerds; literate and skilled content pro-
ducers) who are looking for a warm place inside the establishment. In this effort, wireless has
been a particularly useful case study, as the parallels across history are unusually apt. They
demonstrate that subcultures of innovators and ease of entry into technological and content
production are old features of media, not new ones. Today does feature the advantage of
digital formats, widespread access to rich sets of digital data, and cheaper communication
than ever before. Since great feats of amateur innovation were already possible without these
advantages, it is not clear that these features are transformative. One might not even ﬁnd
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them particularly encouraging when reminded that “amateur innovator” or “amateur con-
tent producer” is itself a privileged and difﬁcult-to-obtain position depending upon literacy,
other knowledge, social networks, class, race, and lifestyle. This is then the call for action
for those who care about the democratic potential of decentralized production. Rather than
wait for the technological changes to unfold, this analysis requires us to ﬁgure out why
each instance of technological transformation from the 1920s to the 2000s never satisﬁes.
“Participatory culture” will only move beyond the elite if the desire for decentralized control
and widespread participation can animate changes in our society’s fundamental structures
of opportunity.
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